

# 能源相互依赖的“武器化”和“去武器化”<sup>1941</sup>

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## 展示框架

一、能源相互依赖的“武器化”





二、能源相互依赖的“去武器化”

三、“武器化相互依赖”的研究议程





## 武器化：旧议题的新议程

- ▶ Albert O. Hirschman: 强国通过操纵国际贸易，以牺牲弱国的利益为代价来扩张自己的国家权力。
- ▶ David A. Baldwin、Michael Mastanduno、Daniel W. Drezner、William J. Norris、Fareed Zakaria: 国家运用经济手段来实现其政治目标。
- ▶ Lisa L. Martin: 国家通过参与多边制度或承受巨额成本来提高经济制裁的可信度。



## 武器化：焦点领域

- ▶ 金融、科技、能源是相互依赖武器化最明显的3个领域。
- ▶ 金融：禁止俄罗斯主要银行使用SWIFT系统进行跨境清算。
- ▶ 科技：美国商务部工业与安全局依据《出口管制条例》将华为纳入“实体清单”。财政部海外资产控制办公室、美国贸易代表办公室、国土安全部国土安全调查局、司法部、国务院国防贸易管制理事会……
- ▶ 能源：1973年阿拉伯石油输出国组织对美西方禁运石油。



## 武器化：主要的案例及手段

OAPEC 在 1973 年提价、减产、禁运促成了“第一次石油危机”。


- ▶ 10月8日，要求沙特阿美石油公司削减一半的管道石油运输量。
- ▶ 10月16日，将石油价格从每桶 3.01 美元提升至 5.12 美元。
- ▶ 10月17日，逐月减产百分之 5 并威胁对向以色列提供援助的国家禁运。
- ▶ 11月5日，石油产量削减幅度提高到百分之 25，重点惩罚美国与荷兰。

美国自 2017 年对委内瑞拉能源产业的制裁，禁止债权和资产交易。欧盟自 2022 年对俄罗斯石油颁布了进口禁令并约束后者限价销售。



## 武器化：天然气而非石油愈发脆弱

- ▶ 天然气依赖于管运，其运输设施专用性较高。
- ▶ 全球液化天然气船的数量为 2180 艘，远少于巨型油轮的 8258 艘。
- ▶ 天然气往往要历经数年的谈判，谈判达成后要签署二十年到三十年周期的超长期合同，通过超长期合同锁定供给国和消费国的模式使得国际市场上很少出现天然气现货。
- ▶ 天然气消费主要满足供暖需求，因而其具有明显的季节性。
- ▶ 俄罗斯与乌克兰长期无法就天然气过境费达成共识，乌曾在 2006、2007 和 2009 年多次切断天然气的供应。



## 去武器化：是否真的有石油武器？

Llewelyn Hughes, Austin Long, “Is There an Oil Weapon? Security Implications of Changes in the Structure of the International Oil Market,” *International Security*, Vol.39, No.3, 2015, pp.152-189.

- ▶ 上游：生产国数量增加、同一国家或同一块油田的石油由多个生产者生产、商业库存增加、石油公司纷纷私有化、石油强度降低与替代性能源增加。
- ▶ 中游（商业）：油轮的所有者在二战后出现了分散，从政府转移到各个船东。
- ▶ 中游（军事）：美海军军事力量集中，可以胁迫其他国家。
- ▶ 下游：炼油厂在不断增加。
- ▶ 除了美海军在公海可能胁迫运输外，石油作为武器的可能性大幅降低。



Concern about the use of oil as an instrument of coercion has been central to state intervention in oil markets. Historically, the U.S. government sought to ensure access for domestic firms in the Middle East on national security grounds.<sup>1</sup> Current U.S. national security strategy identifies the importance of Middle Eastern oil production to the global oil market as justification for retaining a military presence in the region.<sup>2</sup> Conversely, rising U.S. oil production in the 2000s leads some analysts to propose that the United States should reduce its military presence in the Persian Gulf.<sup>3</sup>

Assessing the relationship between oil and coercion hinges on understanding whether states are capable of imposing significant costs on others by curtailing the supply of oil. Yet the theoretical tools used to analyze this problem reflect response to price volatility in the 1970s by focusing on the production of crude oil. The most important long-term effect of the oil crises, however, was the fragmentation of the oil supply chain into a series of linked, but discrete, markets that are not controlled by any single actor or group of actors.

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<sup>1</sup> See U.S. Senate, Special Committee Investigating Petroleum Resources, American Petroleum Investments in Foreign Countries Hearing before the Special Committee investigating Petroleum Resources, 79th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office [GPO], 1946).

<sup>2</sup> The 2012 U.S. National Security Strategy identifies the need to maintain a military presence in the region to guard against an “increased threat” in the greater Middle East. See U.S. Government, National Security Strategy (Washington, D.C.: White House, May 2010), p. 24.

<sup>3</sup> On the rise in U.S. oil production, see Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)/IEA, *World Energy Report 2012* (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2012), pp. 2–3. Ed Morse, global head of commodities research for Citigroup, notes that the rise in U.S. oil production means that “the days of oil as a political weapon are over.” He adds that the rise in U.S. oil production means that “the days of oil supply lines as crucial to other aspects of foreign policy are over.” See Steve Levine, “The End of Oil Abundance,” *Foreign Policy*, July 17, 2012, <http://foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/07/17/the-end-of-oil-abundance/>; Llewelyn Hughes, “The Limits of Energy Independence: Assessing the Implications of Oil Abundance for U.S. Foreign Policy,” *Energy Research & Social Screening*, Vol. 3 (September 2010), pp. 55–94.

International Security, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Winter 2014/2015), pp. 152–189. doi:10.1215/00208166-1200004

# 去武器化：欧佩克“皇帝的新衣”？

欧佩克真的能呼风唤雨，将石油武器化？“石油卡特尔”是否存在？

- ▶ 检验 1：卡特尔的新成员的生产率下降或减速。（×）
- ▶ 检验 2：成员一般应生产等于或低于其指定配额的数量。（×）
- ▶ 检验 3：配额的变化应导致生产的变化，从而产生相关性。（×）
- ▶ 检验 4：卡特尔成员的平均产量（即以较低的速度耗尽其石油）通常应低于卡特尔的非成员。（×）

总之，欧佩克并不是一个有效的卡特尔，无须担心其将石油武器化，再次掀起石油危机。

## The Emperor Has No Clothes: The Limits of OPEC in the Global Oil Market

Jeff D. Colgan

**Abstract** Scholars have long debated the causal impact of international institutions such as the World Trade Organization or the International Monetary Fund. This study investigates Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), an organization that purports to have significant influence over the market for the world's most important commodity—petroleum. Using four empirical tests, I find that OPEC has little or no impact on members' production levels. These findings challenge the question of why so many people, including scholars, believe in OPEC's influence over the world's oil supply. The idea of OPEC as a cartel is a "factual myth" that supports the organization's true principal function, which is to generate political benefits for its members. One benefit of this idea is international prestige. I test this idea using data on diplomatic representation and find that OPEC membership is associated with increased international recognition by other states. Overall, these findings help one to better understand international regimes and the process of idealized change in world politics.

Scholars have long debated the causal impact of international institutions. Existing research considers the impact of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on trade,<sup>1</sup> the International Monetary Fund (IMF)<sup>2</sup> on fiscal and monetary policies,<sup>3</sup> and human rights treaties on state behavior.<sup>4</sup> Notable mostly for its absence within political science is the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), an institution that many people believe can and does manipulate the global price of oil. This is surprising. Oil is the world's most important commodity,<sup>5</sup> and changes in its price are commonly believed to have powerful economic and political consequences. Moreover, OPEC represents an intriguing test case for theories of international cooperation. Like the WTO but unlike human rights treaties, there is a direct material

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1. See Rose 2004 and Rose, Winters, and Goldstein, Rivers, and Torsur 2007.

2. See Rose 2004 and Rose, Hopkins 2005, and von Stein 2005.

3. See Sikking 2011, and Hafner-Burton 2005.

4. By "most important commodity market," I mean oil is the most valuable commodity traded internationally, measured by total market.


## 去武器化：欧佩克的神话为何没有破灭

神话形成于 1973 年石油危机。提高价格、掀起国有化浪潮、实施短期禁运造成心理上的影响。神话为何没有破灭？<sup>4</sup> 4 类人：欧佩克的内部人士；欧佩克以外的石油市场参与者；政府分析师和从事石油研究的学者；记者、政策制定者、公众和大多数学者。

- ▶ 1. 欧佩克的内部人士从错误中受益。
- ▶ 2. 欧佩克以外的石油市场参与者主要对另一些问题感兴趣。
- ▶ 3. 政府分析师和从事石油研究的学者未能纠正。
- ▶ 4. 记者、政策制定者、公众和大多数学者相当合理地选择不投入时间调查欧佩克的确切因果影响，而是依靠其他组提供信息。



## 研究议程：研究范畴和概念厘定



- ▶ “相互依赖的武器化”与“经济权术”、“经济强制”、“经济制裁”、“经济安全化”、“经济政治化”等概念的边界是怎样的？有什么关系？
- ▶ “武器化”作为一个过程性概念，哪里是“化”开始的标志、哪里是“化”终结的标志。宣布、实施、产生影响、产生 1 单位影响、产生 100 单位的影响？
- ▶ 就概念操作化而言，如何将“相互依赖的武器化”操作化，以便在定量研究中进行分析？0-1；定类；定序；定量。

## 研究议程：具体议题的描述

- ▶ 贸易: Albert O. Hirschman
- ▶ 金融: Harold James、Thomas Oatley
- ▶ 科技: Natasha Tuskikov、Adam Segal
- ▶ 能源: Emily Meierding
- ▶ 制度: 田野、安怡宁: 《国际制度武器化的机制选择》, 载《世界经济与政治》, 2023 年第 11 期。
- ▶ 基于对议题的描述为后续的学理化、抽象化讨论提供基础。

## 研究议程：对武器化的回应

- ▶ 政策性：能源通道、SWIFT、产业链
- ▶ 学理性：对于相互依赖网络的探讨，社会网络分析。

### RESPONSES TO WEAPONIZED INTERDEPENDENCE

**Weaponized Interdependence, the Dynamics of Twenty-first Century Power, and U.S. Grand Strategy**

BRUCE W. JENTLESON

**Investment Screening in the Shadow of Weaponized Interdependence**

SARAH BAUERLE DANZMAN

**Weaponized Interdependence and Human Rights**

CHARLI CARPENTER

**Must the Weak Suffer What They Must?**

The Global South in a World of Weaponized Interdependence

AMRITA NARLIKAR

**Weaponized Interdependence and Networked Coercion**

A Research Agenda

HENRY FARRELL | ABRAHAM L. NEWMAN

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恳请指正

